# Round 5 vs. Idaho State DH (Neg)

## 1NC

### 1

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns. **This clash is a pre-requisite to evaluating the merits of the 1AC - Choosing affirmation over fairness distorts the dialogue to a monological form of discourse that undermines any benefit to the affirmation**

Hanghoj 8

Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor. <http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf>

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### D. Best for education:

#### No solvency for their aff without institutional focus - the belief that the state is always-already patriarchal is both a fiction and prevents the womyn’s movement from securing lasting changes in gender relations.

Rhode 94 (Deborah L. Rhode, Professor, Stanford Law School; Director, Institute for Research on Womyn and Gender, Stanford University, April 1994, Harvard Law Review, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1181, p. 1184-1186)

In many left feminist accounts, the state is a patriarchal institution in the sense that it reflects and institutionalizes male dominance. Men control positions of official power and men's interests determine how that power is exercised. According to Catharine MacKinnon, the state's invocation of neutrality and objectivity ensures that, "[t]hose who have freedoms like equality, liberty, privacy and speech socially keep them legally, free of governmental intrusion." n15 In this view, "the state protects male power [by] appearing to prohibit its excesses when necessary to its normalization." n16 So, for example, to the extent that abortion functions "to facilitate male sexual access to womyn, access to abortion will be controlled by 'a man or The Man.'" n17 Other theorists similarly present womyn as a class and elaborate the ways in which even state policies ostensibly designed to assist womyn have institutionalized their subordination. n18 So, for example, welfare programs stigmatize female recipients without providing the support that would enable them to alter their disadvantaged status. n19 In patriarchal accounts, the choice for many womyn is between dependence  [\*1185]  on an intrusive and insensitive bureaucracy, or dependence on a controlling or abusive man. n20 Either situation involves sleeping with the enemy. As Virginia Woolf noted, these public and private spheres of subordination are similarly structured and "inseparably connected; . . . the tyrannies and servilities of the one are the tyrannies and servilities of the other." n21 This account is also problematic on many levels. To treat womyn as a class obscures other characteristics, such as race and economic status, that can be equally powerful in ordering social relations. Womyn are not "uniformly oppressed." n22 Nor are they exclusively victims. Patriarchy cannot account adequately for the mutual dependencies and complex power dynamics that characterize male-female relations. Neither can the state be understood solely as an instrument of men's interests. As a threshold matter, what constitutes those interests is not self-evident, as MacKinnon's own illustrations suggest. If, for example, policies liberalizing abortion serve male objectives by enhancing access to female sexuality, policies curtailing abortion presumably also serve male objectives by reducing female autonomy. n23 In effect, patriarchal frameworks verge on tautology. Almost any gender-related policy can be seen as either directly serving men's immediate interests, or as compromising short-term concerns in the service of broader, long-term goals, such as "normalizing" the system and stabilizing power relations. A framework that can characterize all state interventions as directly or indirectly patriarchal offers little practical guidance in challenging the conditions it condemns. And if womyn are not a homogenous group with unitary concerns, surely the same is true of men. Moreover, if the state is best understood as a network of institutions with complex, sometimes competing agendas, then the patriarchal model of single-minded instrumentalism seems highly implausible. It is difficult to dismiss all the anti-discrimination initiatives of the last quarter century as purely counter-revolutionary strategies. And it is precisely these initiatives, with their appeal to "male" norms of "objectivity and the impersonality of procedure, that [have created]  [\*1186]  leverage for the representation of womyn's interests." n24 Cross-cultural research also suggests that the status of womyn is positively correlated with a strong state, which is scarcely the relationship that patriarchal frameworks imply. n25 While the "tyrannies" of public and private dependence are plainly related, many feminists challenge the claim that they are the same. As Carole Pateman notes, womyn do not "live with the state and are better able to make collective struggle against institutions than individuals." n26 To advance that struggle, feminists need more concrete and contextual accounts of state institutions than patriarchal frameworks have supplied. Lumping together police, welfare workers, and Pentagon officials as agents of a unitary patriarchal structure does more to obscure than to advance analysis. What seems necessary is a contextual approach that can account for greater complexities in womyn's relationships with governing institutions. Yet despite their limitations, patriarchal theories underscore an insight that generally informs feminist theorizing. As Part II reflects, governmental institutions are implicated in the most fundamental structures of sex-based inequality and in the strategies necessary to address it.

#### Political deliberation is the key internal link to personal agency

Gundersen 2k (Adolf G. Gundersen, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 105)

Fortunately, we now have innovative recommendations aplenty for stimulating deliberation,5 covering virtually every institution in American society, including, of course, government itself. The prob­lem at the moment is choosing from among them in such a way as to achieve the widest and longest lasting impact. Although prioritizing deliberative reforms is a far more complex task than it might appear to be at first glance,6 each element of the via media I am recommending here establishes a separate criterion that reform proposals ought to meet. These four criteria helps us sort through the plethora of propos­als now being discussed by academics and policymakers. This is as true of this first element as it is of the other three, for it calls not for expanding deliberation tout court but, rather, for expanding delibera­tion outside the context of public decision-making bodies. Hence, it calls on us to resist plans for stimulating deliberation through the radical de­centralization of society. It likewise recommends that we demand more of deliberative reform than that it shore up existing deliberative insti­tutions, however valuable that might be. Instead, the premium this strategy places on indirect political engagement asks us to look for deliberative opportunities precisely in those places we are least accus­tomed to looking for them: families, churches, civic organizations, professions, public spaces, and the like. To encourage indirect political engagement by encouraging politi­cal deliberation is, in one sense, quite radical, for although it is not at all the same thing as adopting the view that "everything is political," it is tantamount to claiming that "everything can be a site for political deliberation." Conversely, from another perspective this view hardly represents much of a challenge at all, for it simply asks us to recognize the obvious fact that, ever since Athenian citizens carried the business of the assembly and courts into the agora, politics has always seeped out through the cracks of formal institutions. And it is to recognize that, at least within certain limits, this is not only proper, but desir­able—desirable because decisions that are discussed are likely to be wiser than those that are not, wherever they happen to be discussed. In general terms, then, aiming somewhere between Athens and Philadelphia means spurring deliberation. But we can locate our tar­get more precisely than that. We saw earlier that the second element of this strategy is to counter partisanship not only at the institutional treetops, but at the grass roots as well. This second criteria narrows our search to reforms that might stimulate deliberation there—where it is insulated from the inherently partisan pressure to adjudicate disputes and issue policy. But just what does stimulating grass-roots delibera­tion mean? It means encouraging citizens to actively deliberate out­side of formal decision-making institutions at what is normally thought of as the "pre-political" level. It means stimulating political discourse in places that are not normally thought of as "political." It means working to promote thoughtful exchanges among those who are po­litical, but not yet partisan. It means cultivating a public both willing and able to engage one another in political discussion. Finally, and most centrally, it means finding creative ways to support the civic fabric of society, of strengthening those institutions which, while not charged with the responsibility for making political decisions, are potential sites for political deliberation.

### 2

#### We advocate the entire 1AC, but believe that the 1AC’s spelling of womyn with an “e” or “a” should be replaced with a “Y”, as in w-o-m-y-n.

#### Spelling womyn with a Y allows for reclaiming and embodies a SYMBOLIC action against oppression

Michigan State University's Group of Womyn Creating Consciousness Collectively 1 http://www.msu.edu/~womyn/alternative.html

It is important to point out that this alternative spelling of the word "womyn" is not about men. It is about womyn. It is about reclaiming a term, that has been used as a reason to discriminate and oppress us for centuries, and making it our own. These alternative spellings of the word "womyn" is about the redefinition of ourselves, as we are spiritually, socially, and physically, on our own terms and not in relation to men. Throughout our lives as womyn, we have different and unique experiences that differ from the experiences of men in our society. It is our way of telling the world that we DO exist separately from men in our society and that we should be acknowledged as such. By taking the "men" and "man" out of the words "woman" and "wom[y]n" we are symbolically saying that we do not need men to be "complete. We, as womyn, are not a sub-category of men. We are not included in many of the history books, studies and statistics that are done in male dominated societies, thus they do not apply to us, for in these items we do not exist. In these societies men are the "norm" and womyn the "particular," a mere sub-category of the "norm," of men. The re-spelling of the word "womyn" is a statement that we refused to be defined by men. We are womyn and only we have the right to define our relationships with ourselves, society, with other womyn and men. These re-spellings work as a symbolic act of looking at and defining ourselves as we really are, not how men and society view us, but through our own female views of ourselves, as self-defined womyn.

### 3

#### 1. Formation of sex or gender as the basis of political identity is the process by which capitalism divides the working class to make resistance impossible. This guarantees that political demands are not elevated past the level of particularism and reaching the level of the bourgeoisie becomes the ultimate objective

Brown 93 (Wendy, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, “Wounded Attachments” Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 392-395, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795, gender modified)

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thouroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Froucault, respectively, reveal as liveralism’s compainion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relativley minimalist “night watchman or woman” state to a heavily bureacratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureacracy. On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demographic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism’s marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mobilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic arry of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alchoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls “an anatomy of detail,” “disciplinary power” produces social identities (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridicial identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state’s production of welfare subjects – themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age and so forth – potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as the these categories*.* In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal – the transparent fiction of state universality – combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest – a conversion that recasts politicized identity’s substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism’s production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practicies. As liberal discourse converts politcal identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politicially neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism poltiically neutralize rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity cliams to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and person – all of which they also are – but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and wom{y]n are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment – class resentment without class consiousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resentments, retains the real or imagined holding of its reviled subject – in this case, bourgeois male privileges – as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification though class. They necessarily rather than incidentially abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social independence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alientation, commodificiation, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustain, albeit contradictory, social forms such as familes and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitlism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicity politicized marking.

#### 2. The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>, gender modified]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of hum[y]n history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive hum[y]n equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### 3. Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before, gender modified)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on hum[y]n rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of hum[y]n societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more hum[y]ne. This hum[y]nization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is hum[y]n knowledge and not hum[y]n labor. That is, wealth is produced by the hum[y]n mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all hum[y]n wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### 4. Capitalism is the root cause of patriarchy – patriarchy developed from a particular historical division of labor

Farelly 11 (Colin, Queen's National Scholar in the Dept of Political Studies at Queen's University “Patriarchy and Historical Materialism,” Hypatia 26.1, Winter, 2011, Google Scholar, gender modified]

Once Marx’s basic materialism is suitably amended to incorporate the importance of reproductive and caring labor, it coheres with the account of the creation of patriarchy advanced by the historian Gerda Lerner. Lerner argues that **patriarchy is created out of necessity**. **Patriarchy begins with the creation of an initial division of labor by which wom[y]n do the mothering**. **For millennia**, **this division of labor was necessary for group survival** (Lerner 1986, 40). I develop Lerner’s position further by emphasizing how **the creation of warfare** (Keeley 1996; LeBlanc 2003; Burch 2005; Gat 2006), **like patriarchy**, **reflects the precarious situation of primitive ‘‘hunter-gather’’ societies** (Rappaport 1967; Vayda 1976; Harris 1984; Ember and Ember 1992), **and that these vulnerabilities helped establish the practices and institutions of patriarchy, and then of slavery**. **The subordination of wom[y]n becomes formalized**, **and intensified**, **by the creation of superstructures that help stabilize these oppressive relations of production**. **Such relations give men effective control over the reproductive and caring labor of wom[y]n**. **These patriarchal superstructures begin in slave societies, but continue through feudalism and capitalism**. This is Marx’s account of synchronic materialism, the theory that posits more specific theses pertaining to the importance of the superstructure, such as legal and political institutions, in stabilizing the relations of production. Finally, Marx’s diachronic materialism provides an account of how **relations of production** (including those that apply to the ownership of reproductive and caring labor) **evolve over time**. I focus in particular on how **the productive forces of capitalism permit the modification of the worst forms of patriarchy**. **Once the pressures on maintaining** high levels of **fertility subside due to declines in** infant, maternal, and mid-life **mortality**, **a greater portion of female labor can** (and in some cases must) **be utilized outside the home**. The relations of production must permit the productive forces to develop (what Cohen calls the Development Thesis [Cohen 1978]), and this includes the labor and knowledge of wom[y]n. **Resource-poor economies have had to rely more heavily on labor-intensive development and thus have depended more on wom[y]n’s economic participation**. Diachronic materialism maintains that **the degree and form of patriarchy in a society is determined by the productive forces it has at its disposal**. In section V of this paper I explain how the problem of the ‘‘resource curse’’ and the persistence of older forms of patriarchy in societies today cohere with the insights of diachronic materialism. II.

#### 5. As long as capitalism exists it will sustain patriarchy. Regardless of which came first, capitalism’s continued existance necessitates oppressive gender roles, the nuclear family, and wage gaps to provide cheap labor

Smith 94 (SHARON, “Mistaken identity--or can identity politics liberate the oppressed?,” INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISM JOURNAL, Issue 62, Spring 1994, http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj62/smith.htm, gender modified]

The period after the introduction of the Jim Crow segregation laws in the Southern US at the turn of the century illustrates this dynamic perfectly. Far from benefiting from the extreme level of racism brought about by Jim Crow, Southern white workers suffered wages lower than those of black workers in the North.99 Whenever capitalists can threaten to replace one group of workers with another, poorly paid, group of workers, neither group benefits. The only beneficiaries of this inequality are within the ruling class, who pay lower wages overall. The same relationship holds between the wages of men and those of wom[y]n workers, which tend to be lower. In the US wom[y]n's wages tend to hover at between 60 and 70 percent of men's. But this has the net effect of depressing men's wages, for they are made constantly aware that, if their own wage demands aim too high, they can be replaced with cheaper wom[y]n workers. For example, the formerly male occupation of clerical work is now dominated by lower paid wom[y]n workers. The effect of special oppression is to increase the level of oppression for the working class overall.  Besides this aspect, however, **the oppression of wom[y]n** and gays **involves another** key **feature of the capitalist system**: the role of **the nuclear family.** The nuclear family first **grew up hand in hand with the development of class society**. During the early flourishing of industrial capitalism low wages forced entire working class families to work in factories in order to survive. This severely undermined the working class family to the point of threatening its existence. Indeed, Marx and Engels (mistakenly) believed that the working class family was disappearing under capitalism. But from the mid-19th century onwards, the trend was toward consolidation of the family: wages rose enough so that more working class wom[y]n would remain within the home and make childrearing a priority.  The modern working class family developed as part of the superstructure, first and foremost to provide the system with a plentiful supply of labour. The working class family developed as a cheap way to reproduce labour power for capitalism, both in terms of replenishing the daily strength of the current labour force and also as a way of raising future generations of workers through adulthood. Capitalists have come to rely upon 'privatised reproduction', as Marx called it. It is doubtful at this point that capitalism could do without the family.  Engels argued that the role of the 'proletarian wife' meant 'the wife became the head servant... if she carries out her duties in the private service of her family, she remains excluded from public production and unable to earn; and if she wants to take part in public production and earn independently, she cannot carry out her family duties.'100 **I**n order to prop up the family, ruling class ideology compels both **wom[y]n and men to adhere to rigidly demarcated sex roles**--the ideal of homemaker for wom[y]n, subordinate to the family's male breadwinner--regardless of how little these ideals actually reflect the real lives of working class people.  An essential component of bourgeois ideology around the family is the portrayal of human sexuality as 'naturally' heterosexual and monogamous. This aspect of the ideology of the family is so essential, in fact, that the very existence of lesbians and gays who choose to live outside the traditional nuclear family poses a threat to it. Therefore, laws governing sexual behaviour and explicitly defining homosexuality as 'deviant' began to appear in the late 19th century.  Unless one understands the family's role in privatised reproduction for capitalism, it can seem as if the personal relationships themselves which exist inside the family produce oppression, particularly of wom[y]n. Inequality between wom[y]n and men does exist within the family, in that wom[y]n take much more responsibility for housework and childcare than men. But the **unpaid labour wom[y]n perform inside the family is labour which benefits only the ruling class. Working class men have no objective interest in maintaining the role of the nuclear family** as it exists under capitalism, **for it places the entire burden of reproduction onto the shoulders of** workers. Working class men also have an interest in a system in which housework is socialised and quality childcare is available whenever it is needed.  Some feminists in particular reject the Marxist view that the family is part of the superstructure, claiming that this downplays the importance of the personal aspects of wom[y]n's oppression. But the Marxist view simply locates the source of all aspects of wom[y]n's oppression as flowing from the needs of class society. This does not mean that Marxists disregard the personal aspects of wom[y]n's oppression or of any other form of oppression. Since Marx and Engels, Marxists have understood that privatised reproduction through the nuclear family must be ended in order to end sexual oppression and to create the material conditions in which wom[y]n and men can truly be equals in their personal lives. Engels himself said, in a passage from The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State:   **What we can** now **conjecture about** the way in which **sexual relations** will be ordered **after the** impending **overthrow of capitalist production is** mainly of a negative character, limited for the most part to **what will disappear.** But **what will there be new? That will be answered when a new generation has grown up: a generation of men who never** in their lives **have known what it is to buy a woman's surrender with money** or any other social instrument of power; **a generation of wom[y]n who have never known what it is to** give themselves to a man from any other considerations than real love or to **refuse to give themselves to their lover from fear of the economic consequences**. When these people are in the world, they will care precious little what anybody today thinks they ought to do; they will make their own practice and their corresponding public opinion about the practice of each individual--and that will be the end of it.101  Nor have Marxists underestimated the degree of inequality which exists between wom[y]n and men in the family. Leon Trotsky once wrote, 'In order to change the conditions of life, we must learn to see them through the eyes of wom[y]n.' Furthermore, Trotsky argued that,   in order to achieve the actual equality of man and woman within the family is an... arduous problem. All our domestic habits must be revolutionised before that can happen. And yet it is quite obvious that unless there is actual equality of husband and wife in the family, in a normal sense as well as in the conditions of life, we cannot speak seriously of their equality in social work or even in politics.102  **Rather than downplaying oppression**, then, **the emphasis by Marxists on the class nature of oppression leads to an understanding that capitalism must be overthrown in order** to end it. Moreover, locating the root of oppression in class society explains why the working class has an interest in ending oppression in all its forms.

#### 6. Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Discourse doesn’t shape reality – it’s the other way around.

Fram-Cohen, Linguist and Freelance Writer, ‘85

[Michelle, “Reality, Language, Translation: What Makes Translation Possible”,

http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/michelleframcohen//possibilityoftranslation.html, gender modified]

The idea that language is created inside one's mind independently of outside experience eliminates the possibility that the external world is the common source of all languages. But a common source of all languages underlies any attempt to explain the possibility of translation. Chomsky suggests that the common basis of all languages is universal phonetics and semantics, with the result that "certain objects of hum[y]n ,thoughts and mentality are essentially invariable across languages." (13) To the best of my knowledge Chomsky did not develop this idea in the direction of explaining the possibility of translation. In contrast, linguist Eugene Nida insists that outside experience is the common basis of all languages when he writes that "each language is different from all other languages in the ways in which the sets of verbal symbol classify the various elements of experience." (14) Nida did not provide the philosophical basis of the view that the external world is the common source of all languages. Such a basis can be found in the philosophy of Objectivism, originated by Ayn Rand. Objectivism, as its name implies, upholds the objectivity of reality. This means that reality is independent of consciousness, consciousness being the means of perceiving reality, not of creating it. Rand defines language as "a code of visual-auditory symbols that denote concepts." (15) These symbols are the written or spoken words of any language. Concepts are defined as the "mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted." (16) This means that concepts are abstractions of units perceived in reality. Since words denote concepts, words are the symbols of such abstractions; words are the means of representing concepts in a language. Since reality provides the data from which we abstract and form concepts, reality is the source of all words--and of all languages. The very existence of translation demonstrates this fact. If there was no objective reality, there could be no similar concepts expressed in different verbal symbols. There could be no similarity between the content of different languages, and so, no translation. Translation is the transfer of conceptual knowledge from one language into another. It is the transfer of one set of symbols denoting concepts into another set of symbols denoting the same concepts. This process is possible because concepts have specific referents in reality. Even if a certain word and the concept it designates exist in one language but not in another, the referent this word and concept stand for nevertheless exists in reality, and can be referred to in translation by a descriptive phrase or neologism. Language is a means describing reality, and as such can and should expand to include newly discovered or innovated objects in reality. The revival of the ancient Hebrew language in the late 19th Century demonstrated the dependence of language on outward reality. Those who wanted to use Hebrew had to innovate an enormous number of words in order to describe the new objects that did not confront the ancient Hebrew speakers. On the other hand, those objects that existed 2000 years ago could be referred to by the same words. Ancient Hebrew could not by itself provide a sufficient image of modern reality for modern users.

#### Ethical obligations are tautological—the only coherent rubric is to maximize number of lives saved.

Greene, Associate Professor of the Social Sciences Department of Psychology Harvard University, ‘10

[Joshua, Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul”, www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf]

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is anyrationallycoherentnormativemoral theory that can accommodateourmoral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstoodwhatKant and like-minded deontologistsare all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b).This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are notdistinctivelydeontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people asmereobjects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-beingin the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will getcharacteristically deontological answers. Some will betautological: "Because it's murder!"Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about thembecause they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### The aff’s politics forecloses any possibility real social change. If you are concerned with real bodies in pain and suffering, effective advocacy demands that you move beyond yourself to understand the structures in society that make these impacts inevitable. Reject myopic brand of politics.

**Minow 97** [Martha, Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics, and the Law, Professor of Law @ Harvard, p. 56-57]

Identity politics tends to locate the problem in the identity group rather than the social relations that produce identity groupings.235 **Personal testimony about oppression risks replacing analysis of social structures that produce and maintain it**.236 **Personal testimony is crucial to articulating and maintaining memories, but incapable of providing either analysis of the past or constructive programs for the future. Cornel West observes: "we confine discussions about race in America to the 'problems' black people pose for whites rather than consider what this way of viewing black people reveals about us as a nation."**237 **Serious discussion of race in America, he argues, "must begin not with the problems of black people but with the flaws in American society—flaws rooted in historic inequalities and longstanding cultural stereotypes."**238 Identity politics is likely to reinforce white people's conception of blacks as "them" rather than bringing home people's mutual dependence and relationships. Identity politics tends to produce not only defensiveness among white men, but also makes it easier for white men to abandon and even blame people of color and womyn of all sorts for their circumstances. More basically, identity politics seems to breed more identity politics. Judith **Butler put the limitations of identity politics bluntly: "You can articulate your identity all you want; you need the damn resources in order to respond to the concrete problems of bodies in pain."**241 **To get the resources, you need to work with others; to care about other bodies in pain, you need to move beyond your own circumstances.** Racial patterns of inequality persist and expand.242 Yet, there remain twice as many whites as blacks below the poverty line.243 **Something more than identity politics is needed to get a grip on these developments and to engage in resistance to them.**244 A politics not of identities but of envisioned alternatives could bridge identity cleavages without demanding that people dissolve their differences in a pot of assimilation that does not absorb all. I do not want to understate the positive aspects of identity politics: valuable conceptions and occasions for being for oneself and forging solidarity with others based on a perception of a shared trait; important challenges to exclusionary practices; and effective questions about exclusionary practices that claim to be inclusive, such as colorblind policies that nonetheless produce virtually all-white beneficiaries. Identity politics also disturbs the repression of historic and continuing group-based injuries. Yet, ironically, **identity politics responds to group-based exclusions by reiterating the very same group boundaries. The problem is not only that responses to oppression reiterate the oppressive strategy of treating identity as fixed. The potentially multiple, fluid qualities of any person's identity seem to evaporate in the assertion of a single trait. Considerable power must be marshalled to accomplish this disappearing act, given the complexity of anyone's identity. And this magical result does not, at the same time, produce purposes or causes that effectively mobilize people against oppression.**

#### Their politics fails – lack of a mechanism means they can’t convert theory into practice.

Richard Wyn **Jones**, **1999**, “Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory,” ciao

Because emancipatory political practice is central to the claims of **critical theory**, one might expect that proponents of a critical approach to the study of international relations would be reflexive about the relationship between theory and practice. Yet their thinking on this issue thus far **does not seem to have progressed much beyond grandiose statements of intent**. **There have been no systematic considerations of how critical international theory can help generate, support, or sustain emancipatory politics beyond the seminar room or conference hotel.**  Robert Cox, for example, has described the task of critical theorists as providing “a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order” (R. Cox 1981: 130). Although he has also gone on to identify possible agents for change and has outlined the nature and structure of some feasible alternative orders, he has not explicitly indicated whom he regards as the addressee of critical theory (i.e., who is being guided) and thus how the theory can hope to become a part of the political process (see R. Cox 1981, 1983, 1996). Similarly, Andrew Linklater has argued that “a critical theory of international relations must regard the practical project of extending community beyond the nation–state as its most important problem” (Linklater 1990b: 171). However, he has little to say about the role of theory in the realization of this “practical project.” Indeed, his main point is to suggest that the role of critical theory “is not to offer instructions on how to act but to reveal the existence of unrealised possibilities” (Linklater 1990b: 172). But the question still remains, reveal to whom? Is the audience enlightened politicians? Particular social classes? Particular social movements? Or particular (and presumably particularized) communities? In light of Linklater’s primary concern with emancipation, **one might expect more guidance as to whom** he believes **might do the emancipating and how critical theory can impinge upon the emancipatory process.**  There is, likewise, little enlightenment to be gleaned from Mark Hoffman’s otherwise important contribution. He argues that critical international theory seeks not simply to reproduce society via description, but to understand society and change it. It is both descriptive and constructive in its theoretical intent: it is both an intellectual and a social act. It is not merely an expression of the concrete realities of the historical situation, but also a force for change within those conditions. (M. Hoffman 1987: 233) Despite this very ambitious declaration, once again, Hoffman gives no suggestion as to how this “force for change” should be operationalized and what concrete role critical theorizing might play in changing society. Thus, **although the critical international theorists’ critique of the role that more conventional approaches to the study of world politics play in reproducing the contemporary world order may be persuasive, their account of the relationship between their own work and emancipatory political practice is unconvincing.** Given the centrality of practice to the claims of critical theory, this is a very significant weakness. **Without some plausible account of the mechanisms by which they hope to aid in the achievement of their emancipatory goals, proponents of critical international theory are hardly in a position to justify the assertion that “it represents the next stage** in the development of International Relations theory” (M. Hoffman 1987: 244). Indeed, **without a more convincing conceptualization of the theory–practice nexus**, one can argue that **critical international theory**, by its own terms, **has no way of redeeming some of its central epistemological and methodological claims and thus that it is a fatally flawed enterprise.**

#### Discursive focus actively ignores the structural roots of violence

Tuathail, Department of Geography at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, ‘96

[Gearoid, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct]

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action § Marked 08:23 § and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is hum[y]n history.

## 2NC

### Cap

#### This is a new link - a focus on discourse is an abandonment of real change – we must use a materialist focus to solve oppression

Cloud 1 (Dana L. Cloud, Associate Professor, Communication Studies UT Austin, “The Affirmative Masquerade,” American Communication Journal, Volume 4, Issue 3, Spring 2001, <http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm>, gender modified)

At the very least, however, it is clear that **poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind** some of **historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for** any **theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of** historically exploited and **oppressed groups**. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), **we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology** (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) **and fundamental, class-based interests** (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order** better **to inform the fight against them**.  In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to** understanding and **transforming** system and **structure at the level of the economy and the state**. **It** substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even **as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before**. At the core of the issue is a debate across the hum[y]nities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999).  Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates.  Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, wom[y]n are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8).  **In this context of a real** (and clearly bipolar) **class divide in** late **capitalist society,** the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact **encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon** any **commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs** with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of hum[y]nism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41).  Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience. Yet **Marxist theory is not naïve in** its **understanding** of intention or individual **agency**. Challenging individualist hum[y]nism, **Marxist** ideology **critics regard people as "products of circumstances**" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).  Within this understanding, **Marxist** ideology **critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses** such as that of racism or sexism **as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis**. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, **Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation** itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic.  Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique:   Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts **‘what is’ to explain how social differences**--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for** producing transformative knowledges**.** (p. 7)

#### Can’t solve violence against women without abolishing capitalism – it’s root cause is the privatized family that capital requires.

Cotter 2 [Jennifer, Red Critique, September/October, “War and Domestic Violence”, http://www.redcritique.org/SeptOct02/waranddomesticviolence.htm]

To challenge subordination of workers' needs—including all women's need for freedom from domestic violence—to production for profit, it is necessary to transform the conditions of exploitation and private ownership of the means of production that "necessitate" the production of surplus-labor and, as a consequence, need the modern state to adjudicate a portion of these resources to reproduce social conditions on behalf of the ruling class. Women cannot be emancipated from violence against them, through warfare or domestic violence, without freeing them from these conditions of necessity under capitalism. That is, without abolishing the material conditions that reproduce global violence against women—the privatized family and the social relations of production on which it depends (private property)—and putting in place social relations of production based on collective ownership and control of the means of production.

#### Their single-issue resistance provides a route for capitalism to co-opt their resistance – labor is the only issue that cannot be integrated and destroyed by capital

Meszaros 95 [Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition] p. 40

To aggravate the situation, everything is further complicated by the fact that it is not feasible to find partial solutions to the problems that must be faced. Thus, no ‘single issue’ can be realistically considered a ‘single issue.’ If nothing else, this circumstance has been forcefully highlighted by the disconcerting marginalization of the Green movement on the success of which so much hope has been placed in recent times, even among former socialists. In the past up to a few decades ago it was possible to squeeze out of capital what appeared to be significant concessions—such as relative gains for the socialist movement (which later turned out to be reversible both as legislative measures for working class action and as gradually improving standard of living), obtained through the defensive organizations of labour: its trades unions and parliamentary parties. These gains could be conceded by capital so long as they could be assimilated and integrated by the system as a whole and turned to its productive advantage in the course of its self-expansion. Today, by contrast, confronting even partial issues with any hope of success implies the necessity of challenging the capital system as such. For in our own historical epoch, when productive self-expansion is no longer a readily available way out of the accumulating difficulties and contradictions (hence the purely wishful thinking of getting rid of the black hope of indebtedness by ‘growing out of it’), the global capital system of necessity frustrates all attempts at interfering even to a minimal extent with its structural parameters. In this respect the obstacles to be overcome are actually shared by labour—that is, labour as the radical alternative to capital’s social metabolic order—and the ‘single issue’ movements. For the historic failure of social democracy clearly underlined that only integrable demands can gain legitimacy under the rule of capital. Environmentalism by its very nature—just like the great historic cause of women’s liberation—is non-integrable. Consequently no such cause will for the capital system conveniently fade way, irrespective of how many setbacks and defeats the politically organized forms of ‘single issue’ movements might have to suffer in the foreseeable future. However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### AND, Empirics support this naturalization process – politicization of feminism gets harnessed to support economic growth as the goal of action. Furthermore these logics justify interventions abroad.

Brenner 10, Johanna, activist and member of Solidarity: a democratic, revolutionary socialist, feminist, anti-racist organization, and associate editor of the journal Against the Current, “Free-Market Feminism,” Monthly Review 62.7, December, online

Mainstream feminist ideology has also been harnessed to legitimize a neoliberal corporate agenda in the global South. Structural adjustment programs of economic deregulation and public sector cutbacks have been justified by the World Bank as expanding opportunities for young women factory workers in export-processing zones. Microcredit programs for women are touted as solutions to their impoverishment. Meanwhile, nongovernmental organizations run by and for women (and dependent on foreign donors for funding) have not only facilitated the dismantling of public services but have also co-opted women’s activism. Individual empowerment for some women has been substituted for the collective empowerment that only comes when economic development benefits workers, farmers, and communities. Although Eisenstein tends to oversimplify some complex feminist debates about the impact of capitalist expansion on women’s lives in the global South, she makes a good case that, since the 1990s, major institutions organizing neoliberal capitalism have used “women’s empowerment” to distract attention from the distinctly disempowering effects of their structural adjustment programs. Turning from economic to political violence, Eisenstein links mainstream feminism to the war on terror. She offers a historically grounded analysis of Islamophobia as the latest in a long line of discourses through which imperialist projects are justified in terms of “saving” colonized women from the men of their patriarchal, “backward” cultures. From national organizations such as the Feminist Majority to Condoleezza Rice and Laura Bush, feminist outrage was mobilized to validate the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. Eisenstein systematically unveils and challenges assumptions behind Islamophobia, arguing, for example, that contemporary Islamic fundamentalism, far from being inherent to Islamic tradition, is in fact a modern political movement emerging out of capitalist economic, political, and cultural domination as well as imperialist violence. She points out that the status of women varies considerably across the Muslim world in relation to political economies, histories of incorporation into the market, organization of the state, and so forth. Eisenstein’s explication of work by Muslim feminist scholars and activists in this chapter is especially useful, providing an effective alternative to mainstream feminist ideas about the needs and interests of Muslim women.

#### Feminism creates a false conciousness that serves the needs of transnational capitalism by expanding and satisfying its labor force

Cotter 3 (Jennifer, The Red Critique, “The Class Regimen of Contemporary Feminism, http://www.redcritique.org/Spring2003/theclassregimenofcontemporaryfeminism.htm)

It is important to clearly re-state here that the "problem" with excluding the dialectical materialist critique of social totality from feminism is not that feminism does not go "far enough" without it but that, by erasing the relation of women to the mode of production, it actually helps transnational capitalism cover over its "trouble spots", its fundamental contradictions and the economic crises that result from them. The gestures in feminism toward "materialism" and "Marx" without a historical grasping of the social relations of production are ways to help update ruling class ideology and dismantle the revolutionary knowledges necessary to emancipate women from exploitation. Such "updatings" are driven by the needs of transnational capitalism in crisis. Transnational capitalism, to be clear, is increasingly a highly unstable system of production, which requires desperate and violent "solutions" to help try and create "stability" and "equilibrium". Not only does this show up in the daily struggles of workers who are forced to go without basic needs in health care, social security, education… so that the ruling class can fund massive military expenditures in order to protect or gain access to conditions necessary to stave off a decline in profit, it also shows up within the ruling class itself in the form of increased bankruptcies and failed business ventures as wealth gets concentrated into fewer hand. The "root" issue is that the objective structures of private property in capitalism are based on exploitation and the accumulation of socially produced wealth (capital) in the hands of the few and the increased immiseration and impoverishment of the majority. Crisis brought on by the concentration of wealth is endemic to capitalism. As capital accumulates, it becomes increasingly difficult for the ruling class to maintain its rate of profit, in part because the rate at which labor-power must be exploited in order not simply to reproduce existing wealth but to produce new wealth exceeds the historical capabilities of the proletariat. In short, it "overproduces" capital. As a response, capitalists must seek new technologies and labor saving devises and means to raise the productivity of workers and thus increase the rate at which workers can be exploited. In order to stave off falling rates of profit, capital must produce labor-saving technologies, expand production to create new needs (and thus, new sites for profit), and at the same time export capitalist production to new regions where access to reserves of cheap labor can be found. All of this requires a continuous supply of labor-power from which surplus-labor can be extracted. The transnational ruling class, therefore, has every interest in battling over the life conditions of workers of the world in order to control the development and growth of the laboring population and thus, the rate at which it can be exploited. Contemporary feminism has served as a most effective ally of transnational capitalism by helping to inculcate women into the labor needs of transnational capitalism now. The "differences" between the feminists that I have discussed thus far—that is, those such as Probyn who see the "post-" as an enabling condition for women and those such as Rich, Mies and Bennholdt-Thomsen who see it as disenabling for women—is not all that vast. This is because both positions articulate the labor needs of transnational capitalism. Their "differences" are not fundamental differences over the social relations of production. Rather, they are "differences" that are the effect of these relations of production: the fact that capitalism brings about "uneven development", that its constant quest for profit which requires it to expand production, export capital, etc. also requires that it have both "skilled" and "unskilled" labor. Their "differences", in short, are local differences—specific needs of capital for particular kinds of labor—that are determined by the general need of capitalism for a continuous supply of labor-power that it can exploit for profit. The problem for feminism is not the status of the "post-" (whether feminists are "for" or "against" it; whether women are living under "modernity" or "postmodernity", etc). Rather, it is the private ownership of the means of production that cuts across the local differences in production for women in the international division of labor. For instance, "delectable feminism", with its emphasis on an "ethics" for "care of the self", is especially useful for articulating the labor needs of transnational capitalism in the imperialist nations of the North. In order to turn over a profit, capital needs to maintain a skilled labor force to work increasingly complex means of production but at the same time, as a means of securing high rates of profit, it must maintain such a workforce while still keeping the social cost of its reproduction low. Delectable feminism helps with this task by focusing on strategies for women that are aimed, on the one hand, at expanding the market by creating new "needs" so that workers can absorb some of the cost of "overproduction" and, on the other, at reducing the social cost of the laboring population so that wages can be lowered and the rate of exploitation can be raised. It articulates a new "ethics" for transnational capitalism that will enable women of the North to adjust to the specific historical labor needs that capitalism requires of them now in order to maintain profit.

#### Strategies for resistance unified around “patriarchy” fragment effective opposition to capitalism.

Smith 94 (Sharon. “Mistaken Identity”, International Socialism Journal, spring, issue 62, <http://pubs.socialistreviewindex.org.uk/isj62/smith.htm>)

The newly emerging women's liberation movement quickly embraced the ideas of both separatism and consciousness-raising as its organising principles. So, for example, the New York Radical Feminists issued this as its founding statement in 1969: We believe that the purpose of male chauvinism is primarily to obtain psychological ego satisfaction, and that only secondarily does this manifest itself in economic relationships. For this reason we do not believe that capitalism, or any other economic system, is the cause of female oppression, nor do we believe that female oppression will disappear as a result of a purely economic revolution.14 The ideas behind this manifesto were later developed into a theory of women's oppression, which was eventually adopted in one form or another by radical and socialist feminists alike: the theory of patriarchy. While different versions of the patriarchy theory emerged in the 1970s, they had one thing in common: they all separated the root cause of women's oppression from the needs of class society and located it instead with men. Juliet Mitchell summed up the essence of the theory of patriarchy when she argued, 'We are dealing with two autonomous spheres, the economic mode of capitalism, and the ideological mode of patriarchy.' Although socialist feminists attempted to integrate class politics with the theory of patriarchy, this proved extremely difficult to do, both in theory and in practice. As socialist feminist Heidi Hartmann said of the 'marriage of Marxism and feminism' in 1981, 'either we need a healthier marriage or we need a divorce.'15But even before the splits which gave birth to separatist or 'radical' feminism, the idea that 'the personal is political' was well entrenched. This was another habit acquired from the Maoist style of the New Left, which placed emphasis on personal experience and emulated the Chinese practice of 'speaking bitterness'.16 Initially consciousness-raising was seen as a way to propel women into action. Thus an early group calling itself 'Redstockings', issued a manifesto in July 1969, which declared: Our chief task at the present is to develop female consciousness through sharing experiences and publicly exposing the sexist foundation of all our institutions. Consciousness-raising is not 'therapy'...but the only method by which we can ensure that our programme for liberation is based on the concrete realities of our lives.17But rather than channelling women into greater political involvement, consciousness-raising tended to lead women away from activity. The typical consciousness-raising group lasted nine months, and most women left the women's movement after that. For many of those who stayed, consciousness-raising became an end in itself. And it led to a turn away from politics and an ever greater atmosphere of personalism within the movement. Even Redstockings, quoted above, dissolved itself within less than two years of issuing its 'manifesto'. In the words of one feminist involved, 'When you stop looking out, and turn exclusively inward, at some point you begin to feed on each other. If you don't direct your anger externally--politically--you turn it against yourselves.'18The politics of separatism exacerbated this tendency in organisations of radical feminists. Although set up as 'non-hierarchical', the picture was hardly one of mutual support. Instead the atmosphere tended to be intensely moralistic and extremely judgmental towards lifestyle. One woman who participated in a women's liberation group said afterwards, 'If [consciousness-raising is] all you do, then the enemy becomes the enemy within. First they attack leaders, then lifestyle, then racism.' Another described, 'In the name of anti-elitism, they were trying to pull off the most elite thing possible. The meeting ended with charges and counter-charges and a distinct lack of a feeling of sisterhood.'19 Some women's liberation groups carried the idea of lifestyle politics to an extreme, by forming living or other collectives based upon strict women-only guidelines. One extreme such living collective was Boston's 'Cell 16', which demanded that every woman living there practise celibacy; only one third of the women could be married; and any woman who had a male child was forced to give him up.20Within a few years of its founding, the radical wing of the women's movement in the US had fragmented into inward looking consciousness-raising groups or personalistic living collectives. The slogan, 'The personal is political,' had been carried to its logical conclusion: changing one's lifestyle was what mattered, not changing the world. Radical feminists had rejected the socialist explanation that the source of women's oppression lies in class society, but replaced it with a theory which could not lead the movement forward. The reason was straightforward. The theory of patriarchy divorced the cause of women's oppression from class society--a system which oppresses and exploits the vast majority of people for the benefit of a very few. Instead it targeted men--and men's need to dominate women--as the root of the problem. This left the problem of women's oppression as one to be fought out at the level of individual relationships. And it excluded men, whatever their social class, from playing a role in fighting for women's liberation. Moreover, since separatism explains the division between men and women as biologically rooted, this means that the rupture must be permanent. However radical the concept of patriarchy may have sounded in theory, in practice it was a recipe for passivity and divisiveness. Particularly when combined with the high degree of personalism which existed, the logic of separatism promoted fragmentation rather than unity on the basis of oppression. At the same time as it played down the immense differences which exist between women of different classes. The politics of separatism led directly to fragmentation even within radical feminist organisations. Although separatist theory argues that the main division in society is between men and women, it reduces women's oppression to a problem of personal relationships. If that reasoning is used to understand other forms of oppression, then men are not the only oppressors: whites are oppressors, straight people are oppressors, and so forth. And many women suffer multiple forms of oppression, as victims of national or racial discrimination, or as lesbians. During the 1970s, as activism declined, radical feminist collectives became more and more fragmented and demoralised, and whole organisations became internalised and splintered along these lines. The biggest schism took place between lesbians and straight women. There were other divisions as well, including those over racism and 'classism' (used in this context, meaning snobbery) within the movement. But the radical women's movement never attracted large numbers of working class or black women, or Latinas, for the simple reason that the need to fight alongside men in the fight against racism or in the class struggle made separatist ideas unappealing. The black feminist bell hooks [sic] summed up the reasons in 1984. She argued that separatists 'did not question whether masses of women shared the same need for community'. And, she continued, because 'many black women as well as women from other ethnic groups do not feel an absence of community among women in their lives despite exploitation and oppression', the emphasis on 'feminism as a way to develop shared identity and community' doesn't help them to fight their exploitation and oppression.21As the radical feminist movement disintegrated over the years, the assumption behind separatism took hold: that only those who suffer a certain type of oppression can fight against it. The concept of a unified revolutionary movement was thus replaced by one in which each oppressed group would form its own 'autonomous' movement. This conception, 'movementism', was the precursor to identity politics.22

#### Their strategy can only make capitalism more user-friendly – they epistemologically rule out the possibility of revolutionary praxis.

Poitevin 1 (René Francisco, Assistant Professor, NYU. “The end of anti-capitalism as we knew it: Reflections on postmodern Marxism”, Socialist Review. <http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3952/is_200101/ai_n8932891/pg_10/?tag=content;col1>)

It is also interesting that JK Gibson-Graham maintain that challenging their analysis of The Full Monty, or not endorsing the politics of the film, “is inherently conservative and capitalocentric.”48 I disagree strongly. The politics advocated by J.K. Gibson-Graham through their reading of The Full Monty is nothing but liberal politics with post-structuralist delusions of grandeur. It is one thing to say that we are at a political conjuncture in which the thing to do is to work hard for reform, not “revolution.” But it is another thing to argue that revolutionary practice cannot happen on epistemological grounds, and that all we can do is make capitalism as user friendly as possible while obscuring and co-opting the Marxist tradition. J.K. Gibson-Graham’s reading of The Full Monty is both liberal and reactionary. What the postmodern Marxist’s reading of The Full Monty demonstrates is that in their desire to get rid of “capitalocentrism” - the alleged obsession of Marxists with seeing “capitalism” everywhere - they end up reconfiguring and consolidating capitalism back in. In their unreflective romanticizing of reform, and in their haughty contempt for revolutionary thinking and politics, J.K-.Gibson-Graham’s style of postmodern/post-Marxism delivers what boils down to good old-fashioned liberalism: a mild, state-administered “economic justice” platform centered around individual private liberties, neatly packaged in postmodern gift wrapping. The bottom line is this: When one looks closely at what postmodern/post-Marxist theory actually offers, and after it is done “representing capitalism through the lens of overdetermination,”49 all one can strategize about is how to make capitalism more “user friendly.” Gone is the project of getting rid of it. Strangely enough, postmodern/ post-Marxists do not regard these positions as a surrender of the Marxist project at all, but rather, as the exact fulfillment of that commitment.

#### Gibson-Graham do capitalism a favor more than anything – by individualizing the struggle, you destroy any society wide resisitance

Cotter 2 (Jennifer, nqa, “War and Domestic Violence”, Red Critique, Sept/Oct, p. online, gender modified)

Moreover, by generalizing Marcus' understanding of "rape prevention" to explain globalization in all of its practices, Gibson-Graham represent "resistance" to globalization on these same terms: as an autonomous act of private individuals not requiring general transformation of the social conditions of production for all. Far from offering a mode of "resistance", this actually offers a position that is highly useful to transnational capitalism, which is daily trying to dismantle any social resources committed to the economic, social, and physical well being of workers in general, and wom[y]n in particular, in the international division of labor. In short, this position is consistent with the efforts of transnational capital to dismantle social resources and re-privatize them and destroy any conditions for social citizenship in order to stave off declines in the rate of profit. Gibson-Graham's privatized view of globalization and violence against wom[y]n, for instance, follows the same logic as the Bush administration, which, working on behalf of transnational capital, has been working to dismantle social resources for wom[y]n and reprivatize them.

### Case

#### Reps don’t shape policy – it’s impossible to construct the world with just language.

Kocher, Author of “The American Mind in Denial” and Philosopher, 2k

[Robert, “Discourse on Reality and Sanity”, http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality\_sanity1.htm, gender modified]

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of hum[y]n experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent hum[y]n experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent hum[y]n experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of hum[y]n physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of hum[y]n physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with hum[y]n physical experience, hum[y]n physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed, this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant place where they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism — because, let's face it, a society of deconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with people debating what, if any, reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field of diseased rutabagas and would never survive the first frost. The attempt to convince people to create and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committed or sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes and promote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive reality who can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimize and steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.

#### Activism should come before reps – a discursive focus destroys political coalitions

Churchill, Professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Colorado, ‘96

[Ward, “Semantic Masturbation on the Left: A Barrier to Unity and Action,” From A Native Son: Selected Essays in Indigenism, 1985-1995, Published by South End Press, ISBN 0896085538, p. 460]

There can be little doubt that matters of linguistic appropriateness and precision are of serious and legitimate concern. By the same token, however, it must be conceded that such preoccupations arrive at a point of diminishing return. After that, they degenerate rapidly into liabilities rather than benefits to comprehension. By now, it should be evident that much of what is mentioned in this article falls under the latter category; it is, by and large, inept, esoteric, and semantically silly, bearing no more relevance in the real world than the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Ultimately, it is a means to stultify and divide people rather than stimulate, and unite them. Nonetheless, such "issues" of word choice have come to dominate dialogue in a significant and apparently growing segment of the Left. Speakers, writers, and organizers of all persuasions are drawn, with increasing vociferousness and persistence, into heated confrontations, not about what they've said, but about how they've said it. Decisions on whether to enter into alliances, or even to work with other parties, seem more and more contingent not upon the prospect of a common agenda but upon mutual adherence to certain elements of a prescribed vernacular. Mounting quantities of progressive time, energy, and attention are squandered in perversions of Mao's principle of criticism/self-criticism—now variously called “process,” “line sharpening," or even "struggle"—in which there occurs a virtually endless stream of talk about how to talk about "the issues." All of this happens at the direct expense of actually understanding the issues themselves, much less doing something about them. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the dynamic at hand adds up to a pronounced avoidance syndrome, a masturbatory ritual through which an opposition nearly paralyzed by its own deeply felt sense of impotence pretends to be engaged in something "meaningful." In the end, it reduces to tragic delusion at best, cynical game playing or intentional disruption at worst. With this said, it is only fair to observe that it's high time to get off this nonsense, and on with the real work of effecting positive social change.

#### Discourse doesn't construct reality, the subjects do.

Patomaki and Wright, 2k

[Heikki (Research Director, Network Institute for Global Democratization) and Colin (Lecturer in International Politics, University of Wales), International Studies Quarterly, June, Vol. 44, Issue 2, p. 213]

On the boundary of negativity, in terms of epistemology, the denial of objects existing independently of the discourses that construct them as objects seems unable to differentiate between competing truth claims (Norris, 1996). If discourses construct the objects to which the discourses refer, then the discourse itself can never be wrong about the existence of its objects, in any meaningful or methodologically interesting way. Nor can an alternative discourse possibly critique another discourse, since the objects of a given discourse exist if the discourse says they exist. External criticismof the existential claims of discoursesseems impossible**.** Ontologically, if discourses do construct their own objects, then what constructed the discourses themselves? There is, of course, a long and venerable philosophical tradition of overt idealism that attempts to answer just this question. For example, for Berkeley it was God, for Hegel, Geist. We are unconvinced by these arguments, but if IR scholars want to adopt idealist positions then let us at least have the arguments in the open where they might be in the manner of research practices beyond the boundary of negativity. Arguments are still advanced and assessed, evidence offered, and independently existing objects, whether created in the discourse or not, are still referred to.

#### Reality outweighs representations – Montezuma proves.

Wendt, Professor of International Security at the Ohio State University, ‘99

[Alexander, “Social theory of international politics,” gbooks]

The effects of holding a relational theory of meaning on theorizing about world politics are apparent in David Campbell's provocative study of US foreign policy, which shows how the threats posed by the Soviets, immigration, drugs, and so on, were constructed out of US national security discourse.29 The book clearly shows that material things in the world did not force US decision-makers to have particular representations of them - the picture theory of reference does not hold. In so doing it highlights the discursive aspects of truth and reference, the sense in which objects are relationally "constructed."30 On the other hand, while emphasizing several times that he is not denying the reality of, for example, Soviet actions, he specifically eschews (p. 4) any attempt to assess the extent to which they caused US representations. Thus he cannot address the extent to which US representations of the Soviet threat were accurate or true (questions of correspondence). He can only focus on the nature and consequences of the representations.31 Of course, there is nothing in the social science rule book which requires an interest in causal questions, and the nature and consequences of representations are important questions. In the terms discussed below he is engaging in a constitutive rather than causal inquiry. However, I suspect Campbell thinks that any attempt to assess the correspondence of discourse to reality is inherently pointless. According to the relational theory of reference we simply have no access to what the Soviet threat "really" was, and as such its truth is established entirely within discourse, not by the latter's correspondence to an extra-discursive reality 32 The main problem with the relational theory of reference is that it cannot account for the resistance of the world to certain representations, and thus for representational failures or m/'sinterpretations. Worldly resistance is most obvious in nature: whether our discourse says so or not, pigs can't fly. But examples abound in society too. In 1519 Montezuma faced the same kind of epistemological problem facing social scientists today: how to refer to people who, in his case, called themselves Spaniards. Many representations were conceivable, and no doubt the one he chose - that they were gods - drew on the discursive materials available to him. So why was he killed and his empire destroyed by an army hundreds of times smaller than his own? The realist answer is that Montezuma was simply wrong: the Spaniards were not gods, and had come instead to conquer his empire. Had Montezuma adopted this alternative representation of what the Spanish were, he might have prevented this outcome because that representation would have corresponded more to reality. The reality of the conquistadores did not force him to have a true representation, as the picture theory of reference would claim, but it did have certain effects - whether his discourse allowed them or not. The external world to which we ostensibly lack access, in other words. often frustrates or penalizes representations. Postmodernism gives us no insight into why this is so, and indeed, rejects the question altogether.33 The description theory of reference favored by empiricists focuses on sense-data in the mind while the relational theory of the postmoderns emphasizes relations among words, but they are similar in at least one crucial respect: neither grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content.34 Both privilege epistemology over ontology. What is needed is a theory of reference that takes account of the contribution of mind and language yet is anchored to external reality. The realist answer is the causal theory of reference. According to the causal theory the meaning of terms is determined by a two-stage process.35 First there is a "baptism/' in which some new referent in the environment (say, a previously unknown animal) is given a name; then this connection of thing-to-term is handed down a chain of speakers to contemporary speakers. Both stages are causal, the first because the referent impressed itself upon someone's senses in such a way that they were induced to give it a name, the second because the handing down of meanings is a causal process of imitation and social learning. Both stages allow discourse to affect meaning, and as such do not preclude a role for "difference" as posited by the relational theory. Theory is underdetermined by reality, and as such the causal theory is not a picture theory of reference. However, conceding these points does not mean that meaning is entirely socially or mentally constructed. In the realist view beliefs are determined by discourse and nature.36 This solves the key problems of the description and relational theories: our ability to refer to the same object even if our descriptions are different or change, and the resistance of the world to certain representations. Mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a mind-independent, extra-linguistic world.

## 1NR

### Framework

#### This is the most reasonable interpretation of the world resolved.

Parcher, Former Debate Coach at Georgetown, ‘1

[Jeff, February, NDT-CEDA Debate,

http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html]

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Having a meaningful dialogue based off clash is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion.

Morson, Professor in Literature at Northwestern, ‘4

[Gary, work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel),

“Bakhtinian Perspectives on Language, Literacy, and Learning”]

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### **Without critical thinking skills developed through clash and competition we can’t effectively act on content-specific knowledge** **English et al 7**

[Eric English, Stephen Llano, Gordon R. Mitchell, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief & Carly Woods, all former debate coaches, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction” http://www.pitt.edu/~gordonm/JPubs/EnglishDAWG.pdf]

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. “I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.” As Katyal recounts, “the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.”14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as “with us or against us,” the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be [end page 224] apparent—the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a “weapon of mass destruction.”

#### In-round impacts don’t outweigh – focus on local platforms of resistance disempower us from engaging political institutions productively.

Mohan & Stokke, 2k

[Portsmouth Geography Professor, Oslo Sociology Lecturer, Third World Quarterly, vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 247-8]

Recent **discussions** in development **have moved** away from holistic theorisation **towards more localised, empirical and inductive approaches.** In development practice **there has been a parallel move towards local 'participation' and 'empowerment'**, which has produced, albeit with very different agendas, a high level of agreement between actors and institutions of the 'new' Left and the 'new' Right. This paper examines the manifestations of this move in four key political arenas: decentralised service delivery, participatory development, social capital formation and local development, and collective actions for 'radical democracy'. We argue that, **by focusing so heavily on 'the local', the see manifestations tend to underplay both local inequalities and power relations as well as national and transnational economic and political forces.** ¶Continues¶ **Another effect of 'going local' is that the state is downgraded in importance**. **The liberal assumption of much participatory research is that the state has been too centralised, but better localised** research **will make bureaucrats more aware and in touch with locals** so that more appropriate development is achieved. ^^ **Such an assumption ignores the ways in which the state has used 'the local' politically through material and discursive practices that disempower**. For example, colonial Indirect Rule and the apartheid system were at one level about celebrating and politicising local difference in order to govem, but their corollary was that they fragmented political opposition as well as fuelling divisions between 'ethnic' groups.^\* This means that, **instead of romanticising the role of local civil society in** development theory and **practice, we need to examine the political use of 'the local' by various actors.**

#### Bailing on legal change for parodic performance fails to break down gender categories and collapses into quietism

Nussbaum 99 (Martha Nussbaum, 2-22-1999, “Professor of Parody,” New Republic, p ln, gender modified)

What precisely does Butler offer when she counsels subversion? She tells us to engage in parodic performances, but she warns us that the dream of escaping altogether from the oppressive structures is just a dream: it is within the oppressive structures that we must find little spaces for resistance, and this resistance cannot hope to change the overall situation. And here lies a dangerous quietism. If Butler means only to warn us against the dangers of fantasizing an idyllic world in which sex raises no serious problems, she is wise to do so. Yet frequently she goes much further. She suggests that the institutional structures that ensure the marginalization of lesbians and gay men in our society, and the continued inequality of wom[y]n, will never be changed in a deep way; and so our best hope is to thumb our noses at them, and to find pockets of personal freedom within them. "Called by an injurious name, I come into social being, and because I have a certain inevitable attachment to my existence, because a certain narcissism takes hold of any term that confers existence, I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they constitute me socially." In other words: I cannot escape the humiliating structures without ceasing to be, so the best I can do is mock, and use the language of subordination stingingly. In Butler, resistance is always imagined as personal, more or less private, involving no unironic, organized public action for legal or institutional change. Isn't this like saying to a slave that the institution of slavery will never change, but you can find ways of mocking it and subverting it, finding your personal freedom within those acts of carefully limited defiance? Yet it is a fact that the institution of slavery can be changed, and was changed-- but not by people who took a Butler-like view of the possibilities. It was changed because people did not rest content with parodic performance: they demanded, and to some extent they got, social upheaval. It is also a fact that the institutional structures that shape wom[y]n's lives have changed. The law of rape, still defective, has at least improved; the law of sexual harassment exists, where it did not exist before; marriage is no longer regarded as giving men monarchical control over wom[y]n's bodies. These things were changed by feminists who would not take parodic performance as their answer, who thought that power, where bad, should, and would, yield before justice. Butler not only eschews such a hope, she takes pleasure in its impossibility. She finds it exciting to contemplate the alleged immovability of power, and to envisage the ritual subversions of the slave who is convinced that she must remain such. She tells us--this is the central thesis of The Psychic Life of Power--that we all eroticize the power structures that oppress us, and can thus find sexual pleasure only within their confines. It seems to be for that reason that she prefers the sexy acts of parodic subversion to any lasting material or institutional change. Real change would so uproot our psyches that it would make sexual satisfaction impossible. Our libidos are the creation of the bad enslaving forces, and thus necessarily sadomasochistic in structure. Well, parodic performance is not so bad when you are a powerful tenured academic in a liberal university. But here is where Butler's focus on the symbolic, her proud neglect of the material side of life, becomes a fatal blindness. For wom[y]n who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not sexy or liberating to reenact, however parodically, the conditions of hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating, and rape. Such wom[y]n prefer food, schools, votes, and the integrity of their bodies. I see no reason to believe that they long sadomasochistically for a return to the bad state. If some individuals cannot live without the sexiness of domination, that seems sad, but it is not really our business. But when a major theorist tells wom[y]n in desperate conditions that life offers them only bondage, she purveys a cruel lie, and a lie that flatters evil by giving it much more power than it actually has.

#### Policy-making is a pre-requisite – only engaging with the pragmatics of political change can enable emancipation

Gunning 7 (Jeroen Gunning, Summer 2007, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” Government and Opposition, 42:3,)

The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.95 Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures.

That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth’s words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘this means building with one’s feet firmly on the ground, not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete alternatives. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state’s role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de-essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘how security is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one’s research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator).

#### Our model of debate solves this -- Pretending to be policy-makers has defiant performative possibilities that open spaces for resistance to bureaucracy and critical alternatives.

Kulynych, ‘97

(Winthrop University, Winter, Polity, pg. 344-5)

**Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate** within the energy commissions **could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics**. **The existence of a goal oriented debate within a technically dominated area defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens**. **Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients**. **The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. Where traditional understandings of political participation see the** energy **commissions' failure to recapture the decisionmaking process as an expression of the power of the bureaucracy, and discursive understandings see the tendency toward devolution into technical debate and procedural imperative, the performative perspective explains and highlights the moments of defiant creativity and disruptive diversity that inevitably accompany citizen expeditions into unexplored territory.** This attitude of defiance, manifest in the very chaos and spontaneity that Hager points toward as a counter to Habermas's strictly dialogic and procedural approach, simply cannot be explained by an exclusively discursive theory. **It is the performative aspects of participation that cannot be constrained within the confines of rational discourse, that gesture toward meanings that are inexpressible and identities that are unimaginable within the current cultural imagery. These performances provide the resource for diversity and spontaneity.**